Inference attacks mean that a user infers (or tries to infer) 
Introduction
In recent years, various authorization models for objectoriented databases (OODBs) have been proposed and studied. Among of them, the method-based authorization model [5, 13] is one of the most elegant models since it is in harmony with the concept that "an object can be accessed only via its methods" in the object-oriented paradigm. In the model, an authorization § for a user ¦ can be represented as a set of expressions , ¦ can invoke ¥ indirectly through another method execution in several models (e.g., protection mode in [3] ). Although such indirect invocations are useful for data hiding [3] , they may also allow inference attacks in some situations.
Example 1: Let Employee, Host, and Room be classes representing employees, hosts, and rooms, respectively. Suppose that a method uses returns the host which a given employee uses, and a method located returns the room in which a given host is placed. Also suppose that a method office, which returns the room occupied by a given employee, is implemented as office(# ) = located(uses(# )). Now suppose that the physical computer network is top secret information. In this case, an authorization for a user ¦ may be the one shown in Fig. 1 , where a solid (resp. dotted) arrow denotes an authorized (resp. unauthorized) method to ¦ . Suppose that ¦ have obtained that uses(John) = mars and office(John) = A626 using the authorized methods. Also suppose that ¦ knows the implementation body of office as its behavioral specification. Then, ¦ can infer that located(mars) = A626. On the other hand, suppose that method uses retrieves top secret information and therefore the authorization of ¦ is set as shown in Fig. 2 . Then, ¦ knows that located(mars) = A626, office(John) = A626, and office(# ) = located(uses(# )), similarly to the former case. However, ¦ cannot conclude that uses(John) = mars only from the above information, since there may be another host office(Employee) are authorized, then located is insecure since the user can infer located(mars) = A626 under the database instance shown in Fig. 1 . On the other hand, it will be shown later that uses is secure when only located(Host) and office(Employee) are authorized. It is important for database administrators to know which methods are secure and which ones are not. When an administrator finds that a method which retrieves top secret information is insecure against inference attacks by ¦ , the administrator can prevent ¦ from attacking the method by changing the authorization for ¦ . In this paper, we formally define the security problem, i.e., to determine whether a given method is secure or not. We adopt method schemas proposed by [2] as a formal model of OODB schemas since they support such basic features of OODBs as method overloading, dynamic binding, and complex objects. The semantics is simply defined based on term rewriting. Under this formalization, we first show that the problem is undecidable. Next, we propose a decidable sufficient condition for a method to be secure. Furthermore, we show that the sufficient condition is also a necessary one if a given schema is monadic (i.e., every method has exactly one parameter). Finally, we evaluate the time complexity of deciding the condition. For a monadic method schema, the proposed condition is decidable (and therefore, the security problem is solvable) in polynomial time of the size of the schema.
The main idea of the proposed sufficient condition is to "conservatively" approximate the user's inference. The user's inference is object-level, while the approximation is class-level inference. Unfortunately, this question is unsolvable in general [2] . However, the type checking algorithm proposed in [12] can compute a set of classes which contain all the correct classes, although the set may contain some wrong classes. Using this algorithm, we can conservatively approximate user's inference.
In this paper we discuss precise inference in OODBs. Precise inference means that a user can infer (or, is interested in) only the exact value of the result of an unauthorized method. On the other hand, most of the recent researches concentrate on imprecise inference in relational databases, not OODBs. Imprecise inference means that a user can infer (or, is interested in) possible values of the result of an unauthorized method (query) with a certain probability. In [6] , FD-based imprecise inference involving abduction and partial deduction is discussed. In [15] , a quantitative measure of inference risk is formally defined. Imprecise inference with external, common sense knowledge can be regarded as data mining [7, 11] . [14] focuses on both precise and imprecise inference in OODBs. Besides inferability of the result of a method execution, the article introduces the notion of controllability, which means that a user can control (alter arbitrarily) an attribute-value of an object in a database instance. We do not consider controllability since our query language does not support update operations for database instances. However, since our query language supports recursion while the one in [14] does not, detecting inferability in our formalization is not trivial. [14] also proposes, for a given database schema & and an authorization § , a sound algorithm for detecting inferability or controllability. However, [14] does not evaluate the complexity of the algorithm. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the definition of method schemas. In Section 3, we discuss inference attacks and formulate the security problem. We also show that the problem is undecidable. In Section 4, we propose a sufficient condition for a method to be secure. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude this paper. is the empty sequence.
], is defined as follows: 
1.
is a finite set of class names.
2.
is a partial order representing a class hierarchy. When¨p , we say that¨p is a subclass of¨and¨is a superclass of¨p . We naturally extend Fig. 3 . Manager is a subclass of Employee, and Server is a subclass of Host. Method boss( ) returns the direct boss of employee , and method supervisor( ) returns the "second least manager" among the indirect bosses of . Since every method has arity one, 
Semantics
Method definitions are inherited along the class hierarchy. 
%
The semantics of a method schema is defined as follows. To each class name, a set of objects is assigned. Also, to each base method name ¥ b , a mapping over appropriate sets of objects is assigned as its interpretation. The semantics of a composite method is defined by the interpretation of base methods and term rewriting. (¨2) by this rule. In this paper, we assume that a given authorization has already been expanded. 
Formal Definition of User's Inference
In this paper, information provided by a database is modeled as a set of (in)equalities. For example, suppose that a user ¦ executes office(John) and obtains the result A626. In this case, the information that In what follows, we demonstrate that user's inference can be formalized as the congruence closure of a finite set of ground equalities when the two reasonable conditions (Q1) and (Q2) stated below are satisfied.
First of all, we define the information which ¦ can obtain directly from a database instance In Example 1, ( 1) and ( 2) are stated informally.
Next, suppose that ¦ can use at least four inference rules: reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and substitutivity (i.e., if In many cases, this condition is satisfied by just hiding m n from the user. Equalities obtained by ( 2) are not ground (i.e., include variables). However, together with the following condition (Q2), they are equivalent to a finite set of ground equalities, which has many good properties:
This condition is also satisfied by just hiding .
Example 7:
Consider a schema with a composite method ¥ c which has the same resolution P at every class¨"
be an authorization for a user 
, which is a finite set of ground equalities.
Consequently, by assuming (Q1) and (Q2), we can model user's inference as the congruence closure of a finite set of ground equalities induced by ( 1) and ( 2) . For technical reasons, we define the congruence closure through rewriting rules n introduced below. From the correctness of Knuth-Bendix completion [10] ,
Definition 7:
Define n as the minimum set of rewriting rules n on 6 (m n ) satisfying the following three conditions. Intuitively, P n means that the user knows or can infer that
(c), and
This corresponds to ( 1). By definition, the right-hand side of each rule is an object. Note that the existence of 
The Security Problem
The notion of security of methods discussed in Section 1 is naturally extended to terms in 6 ( ) as follows: A term " 6 8 ( ) is said to be secure if there exists no interpretation
is insecure. The security problem is to determine whether a given " 6 ( ) is secure or not.
Theorem 1:
The security problem for method schemas with methods of arity two is undecidable.
Sketch of Proof:
The type-consistency problem is to determine whether, for a given method schema & , there exists an interpretation of & which causes an aborted execution. [8] shows that the problem for method schemas with methods of arity two is undecidable by reducing the Post's Correspondence Problem (PCP) to the problem. In the reduction, each interpretation ) is regarded as a candidate for a solution to a PCP. If ) is actually a solution, then execution 
A Sufficient Condition
In this section we propose a decidable sufficient condition for a given term " 6 ( ) to be secure. The main idea is to introduce new rewriting rules on Rule (Cii) indicates that the user may be able to infer the location of a server. Moreover, rules (Avi) and (Bii) together indicate that the user may be able to infer the office of the boss of a manager. Compare this with the explanation in Example 8.
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The next lemma states that each rule in n is conservatively approximated by a rule in « .
Lemma 1: If there is an interpretation
) = (j © l k ) such that P [oR x] n " n for some o " j (c) and " j (¨), then P [cR x] « " « .
Proof:
We use induction on the number of the iterations of a procedure which computes the least fixed point satisfying the three conditions in Def. 7. 
Proof: By Lemma 1, it can be easily shown that if there is
. The theorem is implied by this fact.
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The proposed sufficient condition is obviously decidable, since the right-hand side of each rule « ¬ is a class and therefore the "size" of the term decreases every time a rule is applied. This implies that uses(Employee) is secure. 
Example 11: Consider schema

Monadic Case
When a given schema is monadic, the algorithm in [12] 
Complexity
We summarize the time complexity of deciding the sufficient condition stated in Theorem 2. Define the size of a term , as follows: , the total time complexity (including computation of
See Appendix C for details.
Theorem 4:
For a monadic method schema, the security problem is solvable in polynomial time of the size of the schema.
%
Conclusions
We have formalized the security problem against inference attacks on OODBs, and shown that the problem is undecidable. Then we have proposed a decidable sufficient condition for a given method to be secure, by introducing class-level inference ( « ) which conservatively approximates object-level inference ( n ). We believe that the approximation is fairly tight in spite of its simple definition, since the sufficient condition becomes a necessary one when the given schema is monadic.
There are several variants of the security problem. For example, [9] discusses the instance-level security. In [9] , a method ¥ is secure if a user cannot infer the result of ¥ under a given database instance. The instance-level security problem is solvable in polynomial time in practical cases.
In several situations, imprecise inference becomes powerful enough to cause serious problems. Moreover, method schemas do not seem a perfect model of OODB schemas since they do not support multi-valued methods, update operations, and so on. Therefore, we intend to extend both inference and database models. Furthermore, the security of incomplete OODB schemas should be considered, so that the security can be checked in parallel with designing OODB schemas. Table   6 (5 ): the set of all the terms freely generated by method signature and variables 
APPENDIX
A Notation
B Complete Proof of Theorem 3
We introduce a syntactic interpretation 
For each
We consider a syntactic interpretation
) with sufficiently large Ã . In order to prove that ) « satisfies the theorem, we need several technical lemmas. 
Lemma 2: Let
is an object of ) « (i.e., the length of
We call Í a reduction string of (
. By the definition of , there exists an interpretation
for some " j (¨) and p " j (¨p ). Consider the -th step (counting from zero)
, where
1) be the class such that " j (¨ ), and ¥ ( ) be the innermost term of
as follows:
otherwise.
In what follows, we show that
1 satisfies the conditions of this lemma.
It is easily verified that To see that Í also satisfies the second condition, consider the execution of
for an arbitrary
, and thus
]. On the other hand, if
]. In either case,
By repeating this,
. Proof: By Lemma 2, there exist reduction strings
) and
the first symbol of
By the definition of ,¨p must be in
is a subterm of
be an arbitrary reduction string of (
). Then, there exist reduction strings Í of (
and Í p be arbitrary reduction strings of (
) and (
), respectively. By the proof of Lemma 3,
is a reduction string of (
). This fact implies the lemma.
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The next lemma states that if
(¨p ). In this sense, « contains no "wrong" rules.
Lemma 5: Let¨,¨p "
, and
, then for an arbitrary reduction string
) and for any
Proof: We use induction on the number of the iterations of a procedure which computes the least fixed point satisfying the three conditions in Def. 8. Basis: Suppose that
is obtained from Def. 8(A). Let Í be an arbitrary reduction string of (
, we obtain
is obtained from Def. 8(B) can be proved similarly. Induction: Suppose that there exist¨" is a subterm of
for some¨1, and
Also suppose that
is obtained from Def. 8(C). Since . By Def. 7(C),
Finally, the next lemma states that if
Lemma 6: Let¨,¨p
], then there exists a string Í such that the first symbol
is¨and for any
Proof: We use induction on the length of the reduction
. Basis: It is obvious when the length of the reduction is zero. Induction: Consider the following reduction:
By the inductive hypothesis, there exists a string Í such that the first symbol of Í B
On the other hand, by Def. 8, there exists a subterm 
. By Def. 7, it follows that
. Hence,
We can choose Ä so that
. Therefore, it follows that
satisfies the condition of the lemma. 
C Complexity Analysis
The algorithm for deciding the sufficient condition stated in Theorem 2 consists of the following three steps: 
For readability, we use 
time. Thus, the complexity of (S1) is . Thus, the complexity of (S2) is given by Eq. (7).
Lastly, consider (S3). Let 
